Labor unions played an historic role creating the occupational pension system in the private and public sectors in the post-World War II era. That system, which was dominated by defined benefit pension plans, is in decline. The transition to a new system is economically and socially painful, and has been accelerated by two financial crises in the past decade. This paper uses a case study of a private sector union to demonstrate how labor unions can influence the renegotiation of the pension contract for American workers. The case study describes how one union evaluated the pension crisis from a sustainability viewpoint, and responded pro-actively by developing a hybrid pension plan that attempted to align the interests of all stakeholders through equitable risk sharing. The hybrid plan developed by this union eventually had a broader influence on the pension community at large and the public policy debate around the pension crisis. "Above all, strong but independent employee representation is required on the governing boards of the pension funds. Both the present job and the future pension are employee interests. Both require guardianship for the employee through his representatives… and as a good many American labor leaders learned from New York City, the integrity of the employee's pension fund assets (increasingly the employee's main asset, and his main resource next to his job) needs to be protected." Peter F. Drucker (1976: 146) "In the present crisis, unions continue to shoulder their traditional responsibilities of being spokesmen for employees in demanding that economic and political leaders take steps to propel the economy forward. The new question is whether the unions should also accept part of the responsibility of defining the policies, the directions, programs and projects for these ends, so as to help their following attain the desired level of high economic activity, and the rising economic and social well-being to which unions are committed. What steps should they take to discharge these responsibilities competently?" Solomon Barkin (1983: 425) The study of retirement and pension benefit design for the past 30 years has traditionally concentrated on the economics and behavioral features of defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) delivery systems. Little has been written about the institutions that sponsor and drive the direction of pension benefit design in our society. One institution that has shaped the United States retirement system in the post-World War II era is the labor movement. In fact, labor unions played a key role in establishing DB pensions for millions of workers in the late 1940s. 
The U.S. DB pension system was not created in the corridors of Congress. Instead, it emerged from a messy process of labor-management negotiations involving industrial strife, contentious litigation, and threats of government intervention. Peter Drucker (1976) and Solomon Barkin (1983) , whose statements introduce this chapter, were prescient observers and commentators on the role of corporations and unions in the 20 th century. Both experts looked beyond pure market economics, to focus instead on the role of institutions to better understand social, economic, and political events and trends. They especially identified with and studied the role of labor unions as economic decision makers. This chapter focuses on the role that unions have played, and can play in the future, in redesigning the U.S. pension system.
Today, the DB system is in the throes of an existential crisis. Pension plans that organized labor helped create in the mid-20 th century went into decline after 1980 and were displaced by DC plans. The decline of the DB plan system over this period correlates closely with the decline of organized labor in the U.S. Moreover, two financial shocks during the first decade of the 21 st century deeply challenged DB plans' very existence. But if change and Schumpeterian 'creative destruction' are natural outcomes of capitalism, then the questions of how social and economic change is managed, and what replaces moribund institutions become worthy of thought and study.
In the next 20 years, the U.S. will experience a transformation of the occupational pension system. How this transition is managed and the form it takes will determine retirement outcomes for much of the American workforce. Even though the U.S. labor movement has been weakened, it is still strategically positioned in a number of high-profile private sector industries and firms.
Moreover, unions still play a dominant role in the public sector. This puts labor unions in a unique role to renegotiate the pension social contract in key parts of the American economy.
In this chapter, we relate through a case study how one labor union, the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW), sought to manage an ongoing crisis among its collectively bargained multiemployer pension plans by introducing a hybrid plan to replace its traditional DB pension plans. In what follows, we describe the development of that hybrid plan and how it gained influence beyond the UFCW and the industries it represents.
Multiple Financial Crises in the 2000s De-stabilize the UFCW's Traditional Defined Benefit Plans
The UFCW is a North American labor union with 1.3 million members in the U.S. and
Canada. Its membership predominately works in retail food and food manufacturing, and upwards of 90 percent of its membership is covered by collectively bargained pension plans. Two-thirds of the UFCW membership, mostly in the retail food supermarket industry, participate in DB multiemployer pensions administered by joint boards of trustees equally represented by labor and management. The UFCW and thousands of signatory employers together sponsor 60 multiemployer plans with $25 billion in assets covering a total of 1.4 million active workers, inactive workers who have earned a non-forfeitable benefit, and retirees. The current ratio of active to inactive participants is about 1:1. UFCW members work in low to moderate wage industries characterized by high turnover and part-time work. The average DB pension benefit is only $500-$600 per month, at present. Some long-service career members do receive pensions that are multiples of three to five times the stated average pension.
As they entered the 21 st century, most UFCW multiemployer pension plans were strongly funded using expected return assumptions averaging 7.5 percent. Illusory funding surpluses that emerged during the frothy capital markets of the 1990s were used for benefit improvements including expensive early retirement subsidies. Funding policy discipline waned as bargaining parties agreed to multi-year contribution holidays. Perverse federal tax policy that capped the tax deductibility of employer contributions for fully-funded pension plans promoted bad behavior by stakeholders. A herd mentality also drove sponsors to invest aggressively in high volatility growth assets, and 60-70 percent allocations to stock were the norm. The UFCW reacted aggressively to these financial threats by conducting an internal review and critique of its pension plans unconstrained by prior beliefs or union politics. The union's response was somewhat unique due to two institutional advantages. First, it had created an internal staff capability and expertise to advise the leadership on all matters related to pensions and health insurance. Secondly, the union leadership, to its credit, had the confidence to objectively evaluate bad news and consider unconventional solutions that would resolve serious problems undermining the benefit security of its membership.
In early 2006, in anticipation of PPA legislation, the union conducted a funding analysis of its plans by applying a number of Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) funding and solvency screens to measure plan sustainability. The results were sobering. Two-thirds of the UFCW's plans triggered two or more of the PBGC's screens, and more than a third of the UFCW's plans were less than 70 percent funded. Just as troubling, a number of UFCW funds that had been fully funded in 2006 were now projected to have minimum funding deficiency problems in 10 years or fewer, and they could be expected to trigger yellow or red zone status in four to five years based on draft PPA legislation.
At the same time that the UFCW was conducting its internal pension study, a number of accounting, financial, and regulatory pressures were being felt. The Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) proposed new rules that would have required multiemployer plan corporate sponsors to report unfunded liabilities on their income and balance sheets at market value using risk-free rates, instead of the plan's discount rate. In addition, credit rating agencies like Moody's and Standard & Poor began to research multiemployer plan sponsors and industries, highlighting the growth in off-balance sheet pension debt by firm and industry (Moody's 2006). Concurrently, Congress tripled multiemployer plan premiums to the PBGC, which was itself experiencing growing deficits, and required plans to report a current liability funding ratio based on annuity rates that suggested even weaker funding ratios for plans.
This confluence of events served as the background to the internal UFCW pension study presented to the Union's leadership in spring 2006. The report raised for the first time a series of difficult policy questions for the UFCW's leadership. One was whether UFCW multiemployer plans were financially sustainable, and what the cost of plan sustainability might be. Another focused on whether signatory employers could afford this cost given the competitive environment.
Additionally the report asked what the ramifications of the pension crisis to the stability of the UFCW's collective bargaining system might be, focusing on the economic trade-offs for the union and its members. In reviewing the options in light of the pension crisis, and assuming pension benefits could be frozen for a generation, this raised questions about the economic consequences for members' retirement incomes. And crucially, if a union deemed its current plans to be unsustainable, the question arose as to what alternative plan designs might be considered.
These policy questions raised a series of political dilemmas for the UFCW, which also became the subject of discussion. Questions arose about how the membership and local union leaders might respond to the pension crisis, and whether the membership might internalize its fear and anger against the union leaders. Additionally, leaders worried that the UFCW and its sponsored plans might be subject to litigation. Naturally, questions were raised about whether the membership would support a strategy by the union to reform and redesign its plans. Of course, any reform would raise the issue of how the union would manage inter-generational equity issues as pension benefits became more differentiated between demographic groups based on when they began working in the industry. And finally, there were concerns that pension plan failures inhibit the UFCW's ability to organize and attract new members.
After assessing the political risks, the UFCW leadership opted for a pro-active, solutionbased approach to the pension crisis, deciding that the status quo was more dangerous than renegotiating a new pension contract.
The Question of DB Plan Sustainability
The pension crisis that started in the first decade of the 21 st century coincided with a number of emerging structural trends synonymous with the maturing lifecycle of these plans, many of which were 50-60 years old. Plan demographics had changed dramatically due to stagnant union growth and the impact of technological change. The absolute number and growth of retirees each year exceeded additions to the active worker population, which was the basis for employer contributions. Active pension participants were now supporting one to two inactive participants, a reversal from earlier decades when the plans were new and growing (Kocken 2011 ).
These demographic trends generated net negative cash flows to the DB plans, with annual benefit and administrative payments exceeding annual employer contributions. Not surprisingly, this created a drag on asset growth and an additional burden on expected investment returns.
Additionally, negative cash flows were projected to nearly double over the next decade, in a number of UFCW plans.
Another characteristic of mature DB pensions is that they become quite dependent on investment income, making the plans particularly sensitive to investment return volatility.
Investment income in mature pension plans accounts for 70-80 percent of total annual income.
And as many DB plans discovered in the last decade, investment volatility can dramatically affect the plan's funding balance. As the assets of mature pension plans grow, they become even more vulnerable to the rule of large numbers. A 10 percent drawdown on $1 billion is 10 times that on a $100 million asset base. Larger pension plans are also highly leveraged, with assets equal to multiples of 30-50 times contributions. This makes it nearly impossible to recover from large asset drawdowns by increasing employer contributions.
Modern portfolio theory failed the DB pension system during the first decade of the 21 st century. Pension portfolios that were assumed to be highly diversified, turned out to actually be highly correlated with public equity risk and therefore vulnerable to major asset declines. The secular decline in interest rates compounded the perfect financial storm facing pension plans. In reaction to the threat of depression, extraordinary monetary policy exercised by the Federal
Reserve sent interest rates even lower, adding to the investment pressures on pension plans. DB pensions with long liability durations faced challenging asset liability mismatches, when long bond rates were below four percent. At the same time, the situation created perverse incentives for plans to take more investment risk than they could manage, in an effort to earn expected returns of 7-8 percent. The mature DB pension model became hypersensitive to capital market volatility: a few years of negative returns destroyed a decade of asset growth and defunded once-healthy DB plans, driving many into a death spiral.
Inspirations for Benefit Design and Governance Innovation
This structural analysis of traditional DB plans convinced the UFCW that the sustainability of their pension system was at risk, requiring it to search for alternatives. This was in keeping with its history of innovating in the pension arena. In 1984, the UFCW National Pension Fund took advantage of high interest rates and eliminated its unfunded liabilities by purchasing an annuity from MetLife for the plan's past-service liability at highly favorable prices. That transaction allowed the plan to re-start the fund as a future-service-only plan. Groups differentiated by area and industry were experience-rated separately based on their individual demographics, but they continued to share investment and administrative experience. The new future service plan was conservatively funded through a regimented process where the plan recalculated the actuarial cost of benefits every two to three years and required the collective bargaining parties to reset contributions given the updated costs. This structure gave the plans a DC-type quality, where labor and management determined the contribution/benefit formulas that fit their special market conditions. This unique funding/benefit system, with its self-adjusting mechanisms, was a major reason why the UFCW National Pension Fund remained fully funded and retained a PPA green zone status throughout the crisis.
Another example of UFCW design/governance creativity was seen with a plan sponsored by UFCW Local 1518 in British Columbia, Canada. The trustees of that multiemployer plan foresaw the secular decline in interest rates in the 1990s, and they made a politically courageous decision to move away from a model that measured liabilities based on expected returns to one that targeted liabilities to certain market interest rates. Instead of spending transitory surpluses on benefit improvements during the mid-1990s, the Local 1518 Plan adjusted its benefit liabilities to market interest rates and adopted a highly effective liability driven investment program that 
Deciding on Pension Design Priorities: The UFCW Evaluation Process
The UFCW constituted a team of pension experts, including legal experts, actuaries, and pension investment consultants, to research and develop a new hybrid design from late 2006 through 2009. In early deliberations, the UFCW pension task force (the Committee) began formulating its goals and objectives. A substantial part of this discussion focused on pension legacy issues and how to transition to a new pension system. While these legacy and transition issues are critically important, they are not the subject of this chapter (see Blitzstein 2013 ).
The Committee began its work by rejecting the traditional DB and DC models. The UFCW's concerns about the recurring structural flaws in the traditional DB plan were as described above. The financial crisis had effectively exposed the myth that all investment risk in DB plans could be absorbed by employers, since participants' experience with multiple rounds of pension benefit reductions suggested otherwise. At the same time, the UFCW recognized the various risks facing corporate plan sponsors. Changes in pension accounting rules, the opinions of credit rating agencies, and the ability of firms to withstand the balance sheet volatility of DB pension liabilities had to be recognized by the UFCW in its new plan design exercise. Avoiding the risk of generating new unfunded pension liabilities became a priority in the UFCW design exercise.
The Committee considered adopting 401(k) plans, but these were rejected because their design imposed unacceptable risks on workers and retirees. These plans' direct shifting of investment, mortality, and retirement risk to participants ruled them out. The Committee was also suspicious of the behavioral economics foibles relevant to DC plans, regarding participant contribution and investment decisions. In addition, the low-to-moderate wage levels in the industries represented by the UFCW raised questions about whether DC plans could generate affordable and adequate retirement benefits. A further consideration was DC plans' inability to provide early retirement options, disability benefits, and lifetime annuities.
Similarly, the Committee also rejected cash balance plans as these did not offer an equitable alignment of risk between employees and employers. In particular, employees gained no upside investment opportunity, and employers were still at risk for investment downturns. The fact that annual floor accruals decrease with age also presented the UFCW with concerns about intergenerational conflicts among its membership. Another problem was that cash balance plan forfeitures from turnover automatically reduced employer costs, instead of remaining in the plan asset pool. A final negative regarding cash balance design was these plans' emphasis on lump sum payment at retirement instead of lifetime annuities.
This exercise of evaluating existing plan designs was valuable because it focused the UFCW's efforts to build its own customized retirement model. While the Mercer Retirement Shares Plan did offer some useful aspects, it did have some features that were contrary to UFCW's goals and principles. For example, the UFCW rejected the concept of employee investment choice within the risk-sharing structure of RSP, and so it did not adopt the RSP benefit variability feature for retiree benefits.
The internal discussion produced a new plan set of design goals, which included the following:
• Benefits should be fairly priced using interest rates more representative of long term historic interest rates;
• The new plan design had to be structured in a way that aggressively managed investment risk;
• The new plan design had to support stable employer contributions, along with a high probability of plan full funding;
• The stakeholders should expect the plan design to meet regulatory standards and scrutiny;
• The new plan design had to be matched with an effective and disciplined governance model;
• Pension benefit payments would be paid in the form of lifetime guaranteed annuities;
• The new plan design had to deliver on the contractual pension promise.
The Mechanics of the UFCW Variable Defined Benefit Plan Take Shape
The UFCW hybrid plan design had taken on form and structure by the end of 2007. The
Committee referred to its creation as the Variable Defined Benefit Plan (Variable Plan); it later became known as the Adjustable Pension Plan (APP). This plan was structured like a DB in that retirement and longevity risks were pooled, and all assets were pooled and managed professionally.
But in contrast to a DB plan, the Variable Plan shared positive and negative investment performance between the employer and plan participants. The Variable Plan benefit is defined as the greater of two benefits calculated separately each year: a 'floor' defined benefit (that can be either a flat benefit accrual or salary-based career average formula), and a 'variable' benefit that fluctuates depending on actual investment performance. Each year's benefit accrual can never be lower than the floor benefit.
The floor benefit is priced using a 'floor interest rate' plus plan demographics. An initial floor benefit was modelled to be $600 per year ( The variable benefit accrues in units (similar to RSP shares). Start-up unit values are set at an arbitrary level (e.g., $10.00 per unit). Unit values are adjusted each year based on actual investment returns compared to the floor interest rate benchmark. Every year, the units earned equal the floor accrual divided by unit value at the beginning of the year (e.g., units earned = $600 divided by $10 = 60 units). The variable benefit is then equal to the number of units times the unit value. This structure is important because, in combination with the floor benefit, it complies with the definitely determinable benefit accrual rules of ERISA, and it also allows for variable benefit changes year to year. In effect, participants are accruing units rather than benefit dollars.
With regard to the variable benefit, the Committee created two rules for surplus management, for the purpose of safeguarding plan funding. These were as follows:
• Any surplus return in excess of a designated percent (e.g., 7-10%) would be capped ('Surplus Cap') and not applied to the variable benefit. These excess returns would become a reserve or margin that would be available as a contingency against future negative investment performance.
• Excess returns earned below the Surplus Cap would be applied to the variable benefit by increasing unit values or units held (not by increasing the floor accrual rate). This approach does not increase the member's ultimate benefit, and as a result does not increase the employer's risk for unfunded liabilities. Issuing additional units provides the greatest flexibility for allocating excess returns through the variable benefit.
The Committee also applied the lessons of asset/liability leverage in maturing plans discussed earlier, to the payment of retiree benefits. A Variable Plan would establish a policy that required the plan to annuitize or immunize all retiree payments when they became effective. The goal was to insure the retiree liability as best as possible, and to ensure that large asset/liability mismatches would not occur; additionally, the intent was to preclude retiree liabilities from dominating the plan's balance sheet over time.
The Committee devoted much of its limited budget to testing the financial robustness of the Variable Plan. Two Canadian consulting firms with insurance liability modelling capabilities were asked to recommend the most efficient investment strategy to deploy in order to meet the Variable Plan objectives. The Committee had two objectives: to achieve a minimum return of five percent each year with a risk parameter that anticipates a low standard deviation of five percent;
and to seek an excess return above five percent without impairing the first objective. After running a number of optimal asset allocation strategies, the Committee selected a beta-test asset allocation The Committee was satisfied that it had created the appropriate policies and funding safeguards for the Variable Plan that fulfilled the original objectives and principles for introducing a hybrid plan to its affiliate local union officers, trustees, given a DB floor that was priced conservatively, with upside benefit potential controlled by a surplus return cap, and with funding risk managed by a flexible unit value benefit system and complimented by a low volatility investment strategy anchored by LDI cash matching liabilities.
The Committee also discussed what could possibly go wrong with the model, and it determined that the one uncontrollable factor in the future of the Variable Plan pertained to governance and policy discipline. The ultimate question was whether pension boards of trustees could break with the conventional pension investment and governance practices of the past, so as to instead adopt and enforce policies unique to the Variable Plan. The Committee was convinced that it could not legally bind boards of trustees to the original policy rules of the Variable Plan.
Only continued trustee education and institutional memory could secure the future.
The UFCW Takes the Variable Plan Public
In 
Conclusions
The U.S. occupational pension system has experienced a painful and disruptive decade.
The retirement paradigm that emerged after World War II is disappearing in the private sector, and it faces political and financial challenges in the public sector. Recent Boeing/IAM negotiations in Seattle as well as the Detroit bankruptcy provide further evidence of the unraveling of the pension deal. The transition from the old to a new pension order has been underway since 1980, accelerated recently due to major economic and financial crises. The future retirement security of tens of millions of American workers and retirees is in the balance.
While conventional economic theory often ignores or minimizes the institutional role of unions and other pension stakeholders in the private and public pension system, this case study of how unions approached the retirement challenge will help determine the course of history for much of the aging workforce. Constructing a fair and equitable pension deal can be successful, as illustrated here. Jim Leech, the CEO of the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan, has recently highlighted the role that labor unions have played in transforming pension plans in New Brunswick, Canada, and the Netherlands (Leech and McNish 2013) . The U.S. labor movement, along with other pension stakeholders, has an historic opportunity to revive the pension contract in America.
